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ABSTRACT  
This article provides an explanation for Thailand’s long-term policymaking patterns from 1980 to 
2011, with particular reference to macroeconomic and industrial policies. It develops a typology of 
reform orientations in Thailand, conditioned by government type (strong or fragmented) and ruling-
coalition type (unelected or elected elites). When under strong leadership, reform was substantively 
implemented; its orientation was forged into fiscal tightening and “exclusive industrial policy” 
when ruled by unelected elites (Prem, Anand, and Surayud), but into an expansionary budget and 
“inclusive industrial policy” when ruled by elected elites (Chatichai and Thaksin). In contrast, when 
under multi-party governments, political leaders were less capable of pursuing meaningful reform 
and ended up with either internationally dominant discourses (Chuan and Abhisit) or pork-barrel 
projects (Banharn and Chavalit). It is further argued that government type hinges upon 
constitutional design while the two-elite struggle has resulted from the political turmoil of the prior 
decade. The assessment of reform outcomes requires a rethinking of the relationship between 
inflation, macroeconomic stability, and growth; and of institutional prerequisites for industrial 
policymaking. Policy suggestions entail constitutional redesign and the redressing of 
macroeconomic and industrial balance. 
 
 
 
* This study has been financially supported by the Emerging State Project (Comparative History 
Approach: Shiraishi Group) under the Grant-in-Aid research project No.25101004 of the Japan 
Society for Promotion of Sciences. 
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Introduction 
Up until the 1970s the modernization approach had dominated the literature on Thailand’s 
political economy by characterizing the country as a “bureaucratic polity” (Riggs 1966). 
Subsequently, the power of civil and military bureaucracy was depleted by popular 
uprisings and organized business (Morell and Chi-Anan 1981; Anek 1988). Since then, the 
country has undergone dramatic change. Despite being one of only 13 countries that have 
sustained growth of more than 7% over at least 25 years (Commission on Growth and 
Development 2008), Thailand was ground zero for the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis, then 
rapidly recovered against all odds, before ending the 2000s in political turmoil. 
Neoclassical, Marxist, dependency, and institutionalist schools have been in competition 
for conceptualizing post-1980 dynamism (see review in Hewison 2006). In line with the 
institutional turn across the social sciences, the institutionalist accounts have gained wider 
currency over time in Thailand. However, the dominant institutionalist explanations are 
seriously flawed in two ways. In terms of political analysis, they do not consider 
institutions as, at least temporally, prior to individuals, thereby downplaying the role of 
constitutional design in shaping human behaviors (e.g. Doner and Ramsay 1997; Khan 
2010; Kuhonta 2011). In terms of economic analysis, they are based on mistaken 
assumptions about the relationship between inflation and growth; and about the institutional 
prerequisites for industrial policymaking (e.g. Christensen et al. 1993; Doner and Ramsay 
1997; Doner 2009).  
This article provides an alternative institutionalist explanation for Thailand’s long-term 
policymaking patterns and their economic consequences from 1980 to 2011, with particular 
reference to macroeconomic and industrial policies, and the relationship between them. The 
discussion breaks down into four sections. It begins with an elaboration of the background 
of my two institutional variables, that is, ruling-coalition type and government type. The 
second section demonstrates the four economic reform paths alternated in the past three 
decades: (a) fiscal tightening and “exclusive industrial policy”; (b) an expansionary budget 
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and “inclusive industrial policy”; (c) international conformism; and (d) provincial, pork-
barrel projects. Following this is the re-examination of the economic consequences of such 
reforms. The thinking of past performances and future prospects requires a debunking of 
the linear relationship between inflation, macroeconomic stability, and economic growth, as 
well as the overstatement of institutional prerequisites for industrial policymaking. The last 
section summarizes the findings and places them within a more general debate about the 
determinants of within-country growth patterns. 
I. Coalition and Constitutional Dynamics in Post-1980 Thailand 
My explanation for the variation in Thailand’s reform paths rests on two institutional 
variables, that is, ruling-coalition type and government type. This section elaborates on the 
background of these two factors. Regarding ruling-coalition type, the tussle between the 
unelected and elected elites has been the fundamental de facto institution that shapes post-
1980 Thailand’s political landscape. The ruling coalitions during the past three decades 
have been led by either type of elites, both of which have differing incentives for reform. 
Regarding government type, it is constitutional design – a key de jure institution – that 
determines the capability of a government to implement reform at will. Put together, my 
framework can be schematically summarized, as shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Institutional variables shaping incentives and capabilities for reform in Thailand 
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1.1 Elite Struggle and Ruling-coalition Type 
As a result of Thailand avoiding being fully colonized
1
 in the late nineteenth century, the 
traditional elite, centering on the monarchy, has long maintained its power and prerogative. 
The 1932 revolution toppled the absolute monarchy and plunged the country into the 
“bureaucratic polity”, in which the state apparatus and policymaking were controlled by 
military and civilian bureaucrats. Not until the chaotic 1970s were the unelected elites 
challenged by non-bureaucratic groups, especially college students, peasants, and the urban 
middle class.  
The emergence of the two-horse race 
The so-called “semi-democratic” regime emerged in 1980 as a compromise between 
democratic movements and the monarchy–military alliance. However, it was the local 
businessmen-turned-politicians – not students, workers or peasants – who seized most of 
the power distributed from the unelected elites, mainly because of their coordination with 
the status quo in suppressing mass politics. On the one hand, provincial businessmen allied 
themselves with the military in supporting the campaigns against communism led by the 
state-initiated Village Scouts (Bowie 1997). On the other hand, they reinvested their profits 
in the social services (e.g. sponsoring funerals, subsidizing schools, money lending), 
supplementing the state’s sparse provision and paving their way to parliament. The 
proportion of businessmen in the House of Representative grew from 19.2% in 1933 to 
37.2% in 1979 (Anek 1988). 
Amid the messy democratization process, Thai politics has been characterized by the 
ongoing struggle between the two groups of elite. The traditional or unelected elite is the 
alliance between the monarchy, military, legal and economic technocrats, and the Democrat 
Party. The unelected elite comprises elected politicians, provincial businessmen, and local 
                                                 
1
 Siam/Thailand should be categorized as a “semi-colonial” state (see Thongchai 1994). 
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mafias. With different power bases, the reform incentives of the elected and unelected elites 
vary to a significant degree. The basic characteristics of the two groups of elite are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 Comparing basic characteristics between the two groups of elite, 1980-2012 
 Elected Elites Unelected, Traditional Elites 
Leading Coalitions Elected politicians, provincial 
businessmen and godfathers 
Monarchy, military, technocrats, 
Democrat Party 
Sources of Power Elections, parliament and provincial 
administrative organizations 
Constitutions, senator, coups d'état, and 
judicial politics 
Political Exchange Mainly material benefits suited to 
local demands, ad hoc moral support  
Moral support, ad hoc material benefits 
to selected people 
Communication Channels  Local connections, vote-canvasser 
networks, local media 
Mass media and education system 
Criticisms Money politics, pork-barrel policies, 
crony capitalism 
Morality without accountability, 
unconstitutional power 
Common Characters  
 
Preferences toward centralized state with ambiguous regulation (to retain 
discretionary power), the neglect of human rights, freedom of speech and 
environmental issues  
 
Two caveats should be noted within this two-elite struggle theme. First, the two elites by no 
means play a zero-sum game at all times. They are not always competing with one another. 
As previously asserted, both groups coordinated in suppressing the mass movements of the 
late 1970s. Thereafter, competition, collaboration, and compromises have all been observed. 
Moreover, both camps not only have internal contradictions and cliques within but they 
also share overlapping social networks such as having common family and school ties. 
Second, this also means that institutions are more determining, at least temporally, than 
individuals, because when actors change camps, their political stance and strategy are likely 
to adapt according to changed legitimate bases of power. Thaksin Shinawatra is a case in 
point. As a business tycoon, Thaksin arrived on the political scene when his satellite 
concession was granted by the 1991 coup leaders (Pasuk and Baker 2009). In contrast, 
when he was leader of the ruling party overthrown by the 2006 coup, he became the 
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“democratic” figurehead of the anti-coup demonstrations. 
Two types of ruling coalition 
It would be misleading to consider all Thai governments as entering office through the 
same routes. Of the 15 governments between 1980 and 2011, 7 were led by the elected 
elites who won the elections (the Chatichai, Banharn, Chavalit, Thaksin I and II, Samak, 
and Somchai governments). The rest (Prem, Anand I and II, Suchinda, Chuan I and II, 
Surayud, and Abhisit) assumed office with the assistance of the monarchy–military–
technocracy alliance. Prem Tinsulanond, Suchinda Kraprayoon, Anand Panyarachun, and 
Surayud Chulanont attained premiership via coups d'état or at the King’s discretion (see 
Kobkua 2003; Handley 2006). Chuan Leekpai and Abhisit Vejjajiva were leaders of the 
Democrats and received indirect assistance from the establishment, with the case of Abhisit 
being particularly obvious (see McCargo 2005; Dressel 2009).   
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Table 2 The two-type governments and the proportion of the military in cabinet and expenditures, 1980-2011 
Constitution in Use Prime Minister In Office  
(mm/yyyy) 
Duration 
(months) 
Proportion of  
(Ex-) Military 
in Cabinet 
(a)
 
Military 
Expenditures   
(% of GDP)
 (a)
 
1978 Constitution Prem 3/1980-8/1988 100 27.0% 3.63% 
 Chatichai 8/1988-2/1991 30 23.9% 2.63% 
 Coup d'état 24 February 1991    
1991 Constitution Anand (I, II) 3/1991-2/1992 13+3 22.8% 2.55% 
 Suchinda 3/1992-5/1992 2 14.0% 2.60% 
 Chuan (I)
 
9/1992-6/1995 33 14.2% 2.43% 
 Banharn 7/1995-11/1996 16 15.6% 2.25% 
 Chavalit 11/1996-11/1997 12 5.5% 2.15% 
 Chuan (II) 11/1997-2/2001 39 8.0% 1.75% 
1997 Constitution Thaksin (I)
 
2/2001-3/2005 49 10% 1.35% 
 Thaksin (II) 3/2005-9/2006 19 10.5% 1.16% 
 Coup d'état 19 September 2006    
 Surayud 10/2006-1/2008 16 11.1% 1.30% 
2007 Constitution Samak 1/2008-8/2008 8 7.6% 1.40% 
 Somchai 9/2008-12/2008 3 5.2% 1.40% 
 Abhisit 12/2008-7/2011 32 5.5% 1.80% 
(b) 
Average duration of the government 
 
25   
Average duration of the unelected elite-led governments 30   
Average duration of the elected elite-led governments 20   
Source: Author’s compilation, except (a) from Chambers (2009) and (b) from Pasuk (2011). 
Note: (1) The shaded areas represent the unelected elite-led governments. 
     (2) Anand was in office twice during March 1991 and April 1992, and June and September 1992. 
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1.2 Constitutional Design and Government Type 
Deficiency by design 
The existing literature usually considers multi-party governments along with intra-party 
factionalism to be the result of politicians’ misbehaviors and personal incompetence (e.g. 
Suchit 1996; Kuhonta 2011). Delving deeper into the politics of the electoral system, I 
argue that Thailand’s fragile, multi-party governments are the result of constitutional design. 
Constitutional structures have functioned as the key de jure institution determining the 
capabilities of Thai political leaders for policy implementation. The power to overhaul 
constitutions has virtually always been in the hands of the unelected elites. To retain the 
upper hand, the most significant tools designed to perpetuate fragmented politics in 
parliament and to impede party institutionalization are: (1) the multi-member plurality 
electoral system, widely called the Block Vote; (2) the appointed Senate; and (3) the 
relaxed regulations for party-switching. All three regulations featured in all but the 1997 
Constitution, as summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3 Comparing the major themes of the four constitutions used between 1980 and 2011 
 1978 
Constitution 
1991 
Constitution 
1997 
Constitution 
2007 
Constitution 
Source Adapted from 1976 
Constitution by coup 
makers 
Coup makers appointed 
National Legislative 
Assembly 
Parliament appointed a 
drafting commission  
Coup makers appointed 
Constitutional Drafting 
Assembly 
Elected MPs  301 members through 
Block Vote  
360 members through 
Block Vote 
400 constituency MPs 
and 100 party-list MPs 
Single-member districts 
320 constituency MPs 
through Block Vote  
and 80 party-list MPs 
Party-switching Allowed  Allowed 90-day membership 
requirement 
Allowed 
Senators Appointed 225-member 
 
Appointed 270-member 
 
Elected 200-member  
Only to amend or 
approve a bill  
76 elected; 74 appointed 
Given more power than 
the 1997 Constitution 
Duration  12 years   
and 2 months 
6 years  
and 7 months 
8 years  
and 11 months 
6 years on 
Cause of 
Termination 
Coup d’etat Promulgation of the new 
constitution 
Coup d’etat  
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Note:  Further amendments of the four constitutions during their uses are not included. 
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First and foremost, with the Block Vote, voters have as many votes as there are seats to be 
filled in their district (e.g. three votes in a three-seat constituency). While parties are 
obliged to field a full team of candidates for any district they contest, voters can split their 
votes between candidates from different parties. The literature on electoral systems asserts 
that the Block Vote not only induces intra-party infighting but also undermines the value of 
the party label, particularly in transitional democracies (Larserud and Taphorn 2007; 
Hicken 2009).
2
 The second regulatory tool is the appointed Senate, which is clearly an 
attempt by the unelected elites to counterbalance the elected in the legislative process. For 
example, in the late 1980s, up to 85% of senators were from the armed forces and police 
(LePoer 1989: 187). Third, to shore up the power of the unelected prime minister (as in the 
Prem era) and to force political realignment (in the way Abhisit went to office), party-
switching is facilitated. Individual and factional politicians were allowed to switch parties 
without risk of becoming ineligible to run for re-election. Before the 1997 Constitution 
took effect, an average of 38% of sitting and former MPs switched parties ahead of  
elections in 1983, 1986, 1988 and 1995 (Hicken 2004). 
Distinct from others was the 1997 Constitution, designed to create strong party and 
stable government. It changed the electoral system to the single-member districts, which 
effectively reduced the intra-party conflicts and drew voters to policy issues. In addition to 
the 400 single-seat constituencies, there were 100 MPs selected via proportional 
representation from party lists, with a 5% threshold. Senators were all elected. Party-
switching was discouraged. Put together, the party leaders had far greater leverage over 
members of their own parties. Being sidelined by Thaksin and his single-party government, 
the old oligarchy and the monarchy staged the coup and redesigned the 2007 Constitution 
                                                 
2
 As stated in Larserud and Taphorn (2007: 44): “The Block Vote is common in countries with weak or non-
existent political parties. In 2004, the Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands, Guernsey, Kuwait, Laos, 
Lebanon, the Maldives, Palestine, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tonga and Tuvalu all use Block Vote electoral 
systems.”  
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to weaken political parties and the elected yet again (Ginsburg 2009; Hewison 2010). 
Predictable outcomes 
In eight general elections held between 1979 and 1996, no political parties attained a 
majority. The largest parties won between 21.9% and 31.8% of all MPs’ seats. On average, 
there were 16 political parties competing in an election, with the effective number of 
coalition parties around 6.0 (Chambers and Croissant 2010). With the Block Vote, split 
returns occurred in over 50% of the districts (Hicken 2009: 97). Factional conflicts, both 
intra- and inter-party, led to the downfall of 5 of 11 governments. Cabinets in the 1990s 
lasted an average of only nine months (Kuhonta 2011: 167). Moreover, each leading 
coalition party lost the subsequent elections because of deteriorating cohesion and financial 
problems (Tamada 2012).  
The 1997 Constitution almost had a perfect design since politicians and voters 
responded to the new rules of the game in predictable ways. Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party 
(TRT) won two elections in 2001 (49.6%) and 2005 (75.4%).
3
 The 2007 Constitution also 
led to predictable results. The seats won by the Thaksinite party (People’s Power Party) 
dropped from 75.4% to 48.5%. From the single-party government, a further two parties 
were allied to form the government. Factions have re-established their important role, as 
before 2001, in the making and breaking of parties and cabinets (Chambers and Croissant 
2010: 9). 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 A counter-argument is the “Thaksin factor”, in favor of Thaksin’s personality and resources rather than 
constitutional change. Nonetheless, TRT is not Thaksin’s first party. Under the 1991 Constitution, he was 
head of the Palang Dharma Party but the electoral results during his leadership were mediocre. 
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Figure 2 Percentages of elected MPs from the five largest parties, 1983-2007 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from the Election Commission of Thailand. 
II. Thailand’s Four Reform Paths, 1980-2011   
The institutional interaction of coalition politics and constitutional design has shaped the 
incentives and capabilities of Thai political leaders. Even though Thailand’s economy has 
shifted toward export-oriented industrialization since the early 1980s and the interest of the 
nation has become the interest of capitalists (Pasuk and Baker 2002; Hewison 2006), there 
are subtle variations within this general course. The typology of four reform paths depicted 
here is conditioned by two factors: (a) government type (strong or fragmented party); and 
(b) ruling-coalition type (unelected or elected elites). When under strong governments, 
reform was substantively implemented; its orientation was forged into fiscal tightening and 
“exclusive industrial policy” when ruled by unelected elites, but into an expansionary 
budget and “inclusive industrial policy” when ruled by elected elites. In contrast, when 
under fragmented, multi-party governments, political leaders were not capable of, and 
deterred from, pursuing meaningful reform; instead, they either resorted to internationally 
dominant discourses or provincial, pork-barrel projects. 
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Table 4 Typology of reform paths in Thailand, 1980-2011 
 GOVERNMENT  TYPE 
Single Party or                
Dominant Leader 
Multiple Parties 
R
U
L
IN
G
–
C
O
A
L
IT
IO
N
  
  
T
Y
P
E
 
Unelected Elites Fiscal tightening and  
exclusive industrial policy 
(Prem, Anand I and II, Surayud) 
International conformist 
approach 
(Chuan I&II, Abhisit) 
Elected Elites Expansionary budget and 
 inclusive industrial policy 
(Chatichai, Thaksin I and II) 
Provincial focus and  
pork-barrel projects 
(Banharn, Chavalit) 
 
Note: Excluded from the table are dysfunctional governments in office during turmoil (Suchinda, Samak 
and Somchai).  
2.1 Fiscal Tightening and Exclusive Industrial Policy 
If industrial policy is ideally defined as “a policy aimed at affecting particular industries 
(and firms as their components) to achieve the outcomes that are perceived by the state to 
be efficient for the economy as a whole” (Chang 2006: 109), then Thailand has never 
implemented any industrial policy. To make it more relevant, I further identify exclusive 
and inclusive industrial policies. “Exclusive industrial policy” takes place when sectoral 
policies were made to favor only a couple of firms that are close to the government. The 
policymaking in this case may entail some efficiency-driven aspects, such as measures to 
ensure scale economies, but it is neither formulated openly nor announced publicly as part 
of a national development strategy. More importantly, as praised by the World Bank (1993: 
7), whenever selective interventions have threatened macroeconomic stability, the latter 
takes precedence over the former. This policy character is found in the unelected elite-led 
governments of Prem, Anand, and Surayud, albeit to various extents and depths. Lacking 
electoral mandate, these administrations leaned on macroeconomic technocrats, usually 
from the Bank of Thailand (BOT) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), as a legitimate 
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excuse, and therefore set fiscal reform as the overriding priority. For most macroeconomic 
technocrats, industrial policy has been considered a market-distorting measure that 
adversely affects price mechanism and resource allocation. However, the unelected elites 
either have their own business (e.g. the Crown Property Bureau – CPB) or have an intimate 
relationship with a handful of tycoons. When necessary or being requested, certain 
privileges would be granted to these crony firms.  
Prem, 1980-1988 
The Prem premiership represents the strongest form of this reform path. During 1979-81 
the current account deficit widened to 7.1% on average, while inflation climbed up from 
9.9% to 19.7% and 12.7%. After trial and error,
4
 the technocrats were vested with the 
autonomy and authority necessary to maintain macroeconomic stability. The baht 
devaluation, and subsequent pegging to a basket of currencies in 1984, was regarded as “the 
single most important policy step since abandoning the multiple exchange rate system in 
1955” (Bowie and Unger 1997: 143). The government also liberalized restrictions on 
agricultural commodity exports, instituted a system of rebates on export taxes, raised some 
energy prices and state enterprise levies, and increased state revenue. From a current 
account deficit in 1978, a surplus resumed again in 1986. Inflation remained approximately 
below 5% throughout the regime (Thitinan 2001). 
The regime’s less known ingredient was exclusive industrial policymaking, exemplified 
in the cases of the public–private forum, petrochemicals, and Surathip. To begin with, the 
Joint Public–Private Consultative Committee (JPPCC) was founded in 1981. However, the 
JPPCC differed markedly from its East Asian counterparts because only matters of general 
interest were discussed and technology issues received scant attention (Felker 2003; Ohno 
                                                 
4
 In the first year of his government, Boonchu Rochanasathian, the leader of a coalition party and former 
president of the Bangkok Bank, was designated deputy prime minister in charge of economic affairs. 
However, Boonchu’s preference for the active role of the state in economic development proved to be 
politically risky for Prem. 
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et al. 2011). More importantly, behind the stage, Prem “carefully select[ed] some business 
elites to join their regime on a limited basis” (Chai-Anan 2002: 129).5  
Second, a well-planned policy toward petrochemicals was pursued as part of the 
country’s most notable mega-projects, the Eastern Seaboard Development Plan (henceforth 
ESDP). The ESDP provoked controversies when the Thai economy suffered from 
macroeconomic difficulties, with most sub-projects being delayed or diverted. However, 
compared to other projects, the petrochemical complexes enjoyed fewer delays of 
implementation. As detailed in Lauridsen (2008), the sectoral policy was strategically 
planned to ensure economies of scale of indigenous firms. The initial plan was a “one-
company, one-product” strategy, even though it turned out to be “two companies, one 
product” in actuality. Tax incentives, upstream–downstream coordination, and optimal use 
of the country’s natural gas resources were encouraged. The Petrochemical Institute of 
Thailand was set up to provide a source of local expertise. Upstream production was 
controlled by the state-owned Petroleum Authority of Thailand and the National Petroleum 
Corporation, with 49% and 15.9% owned by the PTT and the CPB respectively. State 
intervention in petrochemicals earned Brownie points even from a neoclassical account 
(Christensen 1992), and led Lauridsen (2008: 606) to conclude that “the Thai state was able 
to perform its demiurge and midwife roles in petrochemicals in a much more coherent 
manner than was normally the case in most other industries”. 
The last example is the case of the Surathip Group, manufacturer of Chang Beer, owned 
by Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi. Despite winning a 15-year concession for 12-zone 
provincial distilleries, Charoen’s liquor business was dead in the water and by 1986 
Surathip owed 14 billion baht to the banks and 6 billion to the state. Prem and the bankers’ 
association stepped in to help Surathip, merging two players in the industry into a national 
                                                 
5
 Businessmen serving as cabinet ministers also complained that they could not implement their policies 
because the bureaucrats did not give adequate support (Chai-Anan 2002: 123). 
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monopoly and restructuring the contracts to reduce annual burdens. With competition under 
control and the financial burden lifted, the company amassed a fortune. From the mid-
2000s Surathip has become a regional player, while Charoen is Thailand’s richest 
individual (see Nualnoi 2008). Charoen has a direct connection to Prem and the monarchy, 
particularly the Queen (Handley 2006: 376). This economically unjustified bail-out was 
made during the time Prem put off the ESDP projects for fiscal reasons, and neglected the 
request from the then-biggest Thai electronics firm, which inherited 630 million baht and 
asked for a soft loan.
6
 State intervention and industrial policies were carried out by the 
Prem government, but in an exclusive manner. 
Anand, 1991-1992 
Under Anand, a technocrat-turned-businessman, reform was also made in the direction of 
fiscal tightening and exclusive industrial policy, albeit to a lesser extent than Prem. The 
pre-eminent reform was the introduction of value added tax (VAT) to broaden the country’s 
tax base and to eliminate the ubiquitous business tax evasion. Antitrust laws were 
strengthened. Dozens of price controls on consumer items were lifted. Financial reforms 
were also prominent. Furthermore, interest rate ceilings were removed to foster competition 
among financial institutions. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was initiated (Bowie 
and Unger 1997). 
With regard to industrial and trade policies, the Anand government reduced duties on 
raw materials and ended bans on imports and new factories. Quotas in the textile industry 
                                                 
6
 Established in the late 1950s, Tanin was competitive enough to export televisions and radios to Europe, the 
UK, and China. In 1983 it had a turnover of 800 million baht and was ranked third largest in domestic 
market shares behind two Japanese brands. The baht devaluation, an 18% growth-limited bank loan adopted 
by the BOT in 1984, and fiercer international competition led Tanin to liability for 630 million baht. In 1986 
Tanin, with its 2,000 workers, requested a soft loan from the Prem government, which was rejected. The 
lender banks conditioned Tanin not to reinvest in the new production lines but to sell existing assets (from 
Manager Monthly various issues from 1984 to 1990). 
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were reallocated using a more transparent system and aimed at rewarding firms exporting 
to new markets. The BOI’s Unit for Industrial Linkage Development (BUILD) was 
initiated to encourage the development of supporting industries. More importantly, it 
significantly liberalized the automobile industry by cutting tariffs and ending import bans. 
Yet this was implemented in an exclusive fashion. Most auto firms were ripe for a more 
open, export-oriented strategy after a few protectionist decades. However, the Anand 
government did not hold a consultation with the private sector over the pace and magnitude 
of liberalization (Doner 2009: 248-9).  
Further, as it was the unelected-led-government, the bureaucratic reform was steered 
toward the “pro-bureaucrat and anti-politician” direction (Bidhya 1994: 158). For example, 
the power of ministers to appoint and to transfer senior officials was reduced, whereas the 
permanent secretary was given more authority to reshuffle the directors of line departments. 
Rules and regulations were also changed in bureaucratic favor, such as increasing its 
authority to delay any implementation of government policies. 
Surayud, 2006-2008 
Surayud stepped down from the Privy Council to become prime minister. With the 
monarchy and military being the accent, budgets were dissipated on the ideological 
promotion of “sufficiency economy” and “gross national happiness”. The military budget 
was increased by 34% and 28% in 2007 and 2008 respectively (McCargo 2008: 351). It 
also endorsed the Defense Ministry Administration Act of 2008 to limit the elected 
politicians’ authority to appoint high-level military officers.  
There was an outstanding macroeconomic bill, however. In December 2006 the BOT 
launched the 30% reserve requirement, Thailand’s strongest anti-speculation measure, 
which was considered by foreign investors to be a “capital control”. In use until February 
2008, it ordered financial institutions to deduct 30% as a reserve requirement from short-
term (less than one year) foreign exchange transactions against the baht. The goal was to 
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curb the sharp rise of the baht that was continuously hurting Thai exports. The measure 
slowed the baht’s appreciation and triggered a 15% plunge in the stock market, thereby 
forcing the authorities to rescind some of the measures in the following days (Bangkok Post, 
October 1, 2010). Pridiyathorn Devakula, Finance Minister, argued that: “Of the two types 
of investment, investing in setting up a company in Thailand or investing in the Thai stock 
market, we must prefer the first type” (Nation, January 24, 2007).  
The government also pursued industrial policy, with scale economies target, toward the 
Eco-Car project (budget cars with no more than 1300cc for benzene and 1500cc for diesel 
models). It was a step forward in Thailand’s attempt to strengthen its position as the 
regional automotive production hub. Coaxed by the Industry Minister, the Board of 
Investment (BOI) launched the incentive scheme subject to certain requirements, most 
important of which was the firm’s output, which was expected to reach 100,000 units by its 
fifth year in production (Bangkok Post, January 11, 2008).  
2.2 Expansionary Budget and Inclusive Industrial Policy 
The term “inclusive industrial policy”, which I use in the case of elected elite-led 
governments, is closer to the ideal definition of industrial policy. The policy formulation is 
based more on the country’s international competitiveness, with relatively open state-
business consultancy and more concern over technological development of indigenous 
firms. As the traditional elites are extremely picky in choosing their “business partnership”, 
those excluded from the establishment’s network usually resort to elected politicians who 
are more open and willing to make a deal on a case-by-case basis. Despite pervasive 
backroom deals and lobbying, industrial policy under elected leaders is less exclusive. A 
typical ingredient of this reform path is expansionary budget to invest in infrastructural 
megaprojects. Rent creation for their partisans is a clear incentive. Some infrastructural 
projects, however, rest on an economic rationale, particularly after being put off by 
austerity schemes of the unelected administrations.  
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Chatichai, 1988-1991 
Chatichai Choonhavan was an elected prime minister who took office for the first time 
since the 1973-6 democratic spell. Although being in operation under the 1978 Constitution, 
elected politicians were relatively consolidated in taking power back from Prem and the 
military.
7
 His cabinet positions were mostly politicians or party backers. Together they 
fought against technocrats over budgets, economic plans, and the rules for stationing senior 
officials. The government shifted funds from the military to support its schemes to promote 
growth, particularly in the provinces.  
To expand the economy, the Chatichai government raised the fiscal budget by 10% and 
lifted the limit on public-sector foreign borrowing from US$1 billion (under Prem) to 
US$2.5 billion in 1990 (Doner 2009: 123). The Finance Minister argued that the 
government needed to “accommodate economic expansion” and that it was “not important 
whether it’s a balanced budget” (Christensen 1990: 179). The minimum wage was raised by 
25%. The Southern Seaboard Project to build deep sea ports gained preliminary approval 
(but was called off after the 1991 coup). Further endorsed large-scale infrastructure projects 
included: a second-stage expressway; Bangkok’s railway system (known as the Sky Train); 
and an advanced telecommunications scheme for 3 million landlines. The last one was then 
the largest investment ever to be made in Thailand (Christensen 1991: 200-2). Even foreign 
policy was oriented toward economic growth by converting Indochina from “a battlefield 
into a trading market”. 
Notwithstanding valid claims of corruption and cronyism, industrial entrepreneurs and 
associations had a louder voice. As the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI) called for the 
reduction of import taxes on capital goods and machinery, most of the tariffs were reduced 
                                                 
7
 The consolidation of elected politicians under Chatichai was much higher than Banharn and Chavalit, but far 
less constitutionally supported than Thaksin. 
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to 5% in 1990, “marking a major policy revision.” (Christensen 1991: 203). The BOI, for 
the first time, launched an R&D tax incentive in 1989 by enforcing technology-transfer 
mandates in return for promotional campaigns (Felker 2001). Although the government was 
poised to dissolve the BOI in 1990 due to the decline of investment applications, pressures 
from business groups talked the government into shifting the BOI’s thrust from investment 
promotion to industrial development by focusing more on promoting Thai industries abroad 
and developing local subcontractors (Shain 1993). 
Thaksin, 2001-2006 
Thaksin Shinawatra is a tycoon-turned-politician who made his fortune through state 
concessions in telecommunications. His government represents the strongest form of this 
reform path. With the 1997 Constitution, TRT oversaw a period of unprecedented single-
party-dominance executive stability. The government provided fiscal stimulus through a 
number of grassroots programs such as a debt moratorium program for farmers and the 
One-Million-Baht Village Fund. The Thai economy had grown at an average of 5% per 
annum during his tenure.  
In terms of policymaking, the Thaksin administration was the first government that 
systematically formulated selective industrial policies and forcefully placed science, 
technology, and innovation high on the agenda (Lauridsen 2009; Patarapong 2011). The 
National Competitiveness Committee chaired by the prime minister was inaugurated, with 
the overarching concept of “cluster development”. Five industries were set as the target for 
further support (automotive, fashion, food, tourism, and software) with the 
electronic/electrical appliances sector added afterwards. Moreover, a special investment 
package to promote socially desirable activities of Skill, Technology, and Innovation (STI) 
has been initiated by the BOI. The most successful outcome was seen in automobiles. The 
four-year master plan was clear and detailed, and all the objectives, such as producing 1 
million cars per year and achieving localization of 60%, were achieved in 2005, one year 
ahead of schedule (Ohno 2006: 39-40). Another major shift took place in the hard disk 
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drives industry, as the long-standing paucity of university–industry linkages was partially 
remedied (Lauridsen 2009). 
The Thai bureaucratic system, notorious for its bloated structure and functional 
duplication, underwent a radical transformation for the first time since the 1890s. The long-
awaited downsizing plan was aimed at reducing the public workforce by 500,000 through 
the early-retirement scheme. At the end of the first-round reform in 2004, a survey by the 
Office of Public Sector Development Commission claimed to cut 30-50% of red tape and 
procedures, while approximately 70,000 civil servants opted to retire early (Bangkok Post, 
October 10, 2005). Budgetary management was also reoriented. The Bureau of the Budget 
(BOB) was ordered to replace the old system with a new policy of Strategic Performance 
Based Budget System, shifting the procedure of budget allocation from (a) the bottom-up 
approach from line ministries to the top-down approach from the prime minister and the 
ruling party, and (b) the function-based budget allocation to the agenda-based one (Suehiro 
forthcoming). 
Yet, though the new policy framework for building indigenous technological capabilities 
bore fruits in certain sectors and agencies, the Thaksin government failed to institutionalize 
the mechanisms to enforce, monitor, and evaluate policy outcomes. Most importantly, the 
TRT was composed largely of the group of so-called concessionaries, mostly in services. 
The Thaksin government therefore protected the interests of his own and these big 
businesses by, for example, delaying the privatization of telecommunication agencies and 
the establishment of independent regulatory commissions, and writing off substantial 
amounts of bad debts for close allies (see Pasuk and Baker 2009; Lauridsen 2009).  
2.3 International Conformism 
The Democrat Party is ideologically conservative whose founders were royalist and 
aristocratic (Kuhonta 2011: 168). The party has never won an outright majority, thus 
relying heavily on multi-party coalitions and traditional elite for political support. Under 
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the Democrat-led governments, reforms were carried out in accordance with the world’s 
dominant discourse of the time, namely, neoliberalism in the 1990s and Keynesianism in 
the late 2000s.  
Chuan began his first term (1992-5) after the May 1991 clash that slashed the military 
power. Despite high expectations of reform, the government turned out to have a “legalistic 
and plodding decision-making style and a pronounced tendency to compromise rather than 
push for real change” (King and LoGerfo 1996: 105-6). A few milestones included the 
opening of the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) to facilitate lending by 
foreigners to Thai firms. In exchange for the IMF’s support package after the 1997-8 Asian 
financial crisis, Chuan’s second government (1997-2001) committed to neoliberal reform, 
especially in the financial sector, to the neglect of falling real sectors (Hewison 2005: 315). 
In terms of industrial policy, a series of skills development was initiated. The most 
ambitious effort was the Industrial Restructuring Program to upgrade 13 sectors, which 
ended in failure owing to weak business association involvement and the ministries’ 
reluctance to give up resources to the quasi-autonomous institutes (Doner 2009: 128-9).   
The Democrats took office again in December 2008, at the height of the global financial 
crisis. The Thai economy shrank by 2.3% and exports fell by 14%. Long criticizing 
Thaksin’s expansionary programs, Abhisit called his 115-billion-baht stimulus package the 
Keynesian policy, arguing that: “This is…Keynesian policy which everybody is doing. I 
don’t know of any country that is not pursuing this line. I don’t know any school of thought 
that says we could be doing otherwise” (Nation, February 23, 2009). Key policies included 
the 15-year free education scheme, the skills’ training scheme, the 500-baht monthly 
allowance for the elderly, excise and value-added tax waiver for diesel, and further 
subsidies for electricity, water, and transport. The military budget rose by 50% in the 
Abhisit government to reach a record high for the 2000s. Yet, the Abhisit administration 
also witnessed certain radical reform attempts such as the Land and Building Tax Bill. 
However, with strong resistance from both elected and unelected elites, the bill was not 
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submitted to parliament until the end of his government. 
2.4 Provincial and Pork-barrel Projects 
The least productive reform was witnessed when Thailand was ruled by the weak coalition 
governments of Banharn and Chavalit. But this reform path is not totally futile. Road-
building projects, usually regarded as a pork-barrel policy, are a key means to integrating 
remote areas to the national and the world economy. Yet, compared to other paths, they 
yielded limited impacts.  
As an MP for Suphaburi province, Banharn Silpa-archa raised 0.5% of the total state 
fund for highway constructions that the province received in 1966 to 11.9% in 1980, 
making him a source of collective pride among provincial voters (Nishizaki 20011). 
However, national politics saw him as an unprincipled opportunist functioning as “the 
walking ATM”, as the corruption reportedly amounted to half of all budget project funds 
(Doner 2009: 124). Overall, policies of the Banharn government (1995-96) were driven by 
the logic of patronage and particularistic connections. His government was also involved in 
the Bangkok Bank of Commerce scandal, which heralded the 1997 financial crisis. Having 
benefited from defections from Banharn’s party, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh constructed a six-
party coalition government (1996-97). Even though the cabinet looked more economically 
competent than its predecessors, the capacity for any reform was institutionally constrained 
by fragmented politics. A tighter fiscal stance was proposed before the financial crisis, but 
caused intense opposition within the cabinet because they threatened to eliminate prized 
pieces of legislative pork (MacIntyre 2001). As summarized by Thitinan (2001: 375), both 
the Banharn and Chavalit governments “proved unable to arrest the runaway banking and 
non-bank insolvencies…Neither management overhaul and capital reduction nor closures 
and liquidations of insolvent financial institutions were undertaken during 1996-97 until 
they were required by the IMF loan conditionalities.” 
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III. Economic Consequences of Reform Politics 
Assessment of any reform hinges upon the economic theories that one uses as an analytical 
lens. With a focus on macroeconomic and industrial policies, this section seeks to redress 
the balance of both policies in the interpretation of Thailand’s past performance and the 
thinking of future prospects. On the macroeconomic side, the assumed linear relationship 
between inflation and growth is fundamentally flawed, while on the industrial side the 
importance of institutional prerequisites is overstated.  
3.1 Rethinking Macroeconomic Management and Consequences 
Taking into account the varying reform paths discussed in the previous section, this article 
maintains that Thailand’s relatively successful economic development has resulted from the 
combination of: (a) macroeconomic stability; (b) certain industrial policies; and (c) ad hoc 
bureaucratic and infrastructural restructuring. The realization of this combination really 
matters in the taking-stock-and-looking-ahead task, as it runs contrary to the conventional 
wisdom that considers “low inflation and hard budget constraints” to be Thailand’s recipe 
for growth. 
Many Thai specialists from either institutionalist or neoclassical traditions characterize 
the Thai political economy, mainly from 1980 to 2000, as the bifurcated state (e.g. 
Christensen et al. 1993; Warr and Bhanupong 1996; Doner and Ramsay 1997; Unger 1998; 
Thitinan 2001; Khan 2000, 2010). The Thai state is bifurcated because it had institutionally 
been “divided between a centralized, insulated, and efficient set of macroeconomic 
agencies on the one hand and more politicized, fragmented sectoral agencies on the other” 
(Doner and Ramsay 1997: 248). Even though sectoral policies were operated within a 
clientelistic setting, Thailand managed to achieve rapid growth largely as a result of 
conservative fiscal and monetary policies championed by the BOT and MOF. With “corny 
capitalism” being blamed as the cause of the 1997 financial crisis, macroeconomic 
stabilization has since been given further justification. The BOT has put inflation targeting 
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as the dominant framework since April 2000 and successfully retained the low rates very 
much as targeted. If peak years (due to external shocks such as oil crises) were removed, 
the average rate of inflation in Thailand in the long period of 1970-2005 was around 4% per 
year (Jansen and Choedchai 2009), which is exceptionally lower than that of most other 
developing countries, including East Asian ones during their catching-up periods. 
Figure 3 Inflation rate in Thailand, 1980-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculation from World Bank data. 
 
The economics of inflation targeting 
Developing countries have been convinced that macroeconomic stability is defined by low 
inflation, with a target of 1-3%. To “inflation hawks”, controlling inflation is a means to 
achieving faster, more stable, and more equitable growth. This is, however, a downright 
myth. The relationship between inflation and economic growth does not proceed in a linear 
fashion. In the economics literature it is always about threshold.  
Many studies show no statistically significant relationship when inflation falls below a 
certain level. For example, Barro (1997), a veteran macroeconomist, finds no significant 
relation between economic growth and inflation when inflation falls below 8-10%. A more 
recent dynamic panel threshold model even concludes that, for developing countries, 
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inflation hampers long-term economic growth only when it exceeds 17% (Kremer et al. 
2013). Historically, moderately high inflation is compatible with rapid economic growth in 
many countries. For example, during the 1960s and 1970s, annual per capita income in 
South Korea was growing at 7%, in parallel with an average inflation rate of around 20% 
(Chang 2010). For Korean policymakers at that time, the ultimate goal was economic 
growth, believing that “[l]ow growth increases unemployment and in turn political 
instability” (Haggard et al. 1994: 42). In contrast, there is strong evidence that excessive 
anti-inflationary measures can adversely affect economic growth, output growth, 
employment rate, and poverty reduction. For many countries, the periods of low inflation 
have been among those with the slowest rates of economic growth, such as Argentina in 
1994-2001 and Brazil in 1996-2003. After all, inflation is just an intermediate variable, less 
important in its own right and more important for its impact on variables that are of greater 
concern, such as stability and growth (Stiglitz et al. 2006). 
The politics of inflation crediting 
Acknowledgement of the non-linear relationship between inflation and growth can have a 
more profound implication in political terms. To begin with, the bifurcated state argument, 
even applied to the pre-2000 period, overrates the “low inflation and hard budget 
constraints” factor in assessing Thailand’s past performance, while the costs and negative 
impacts thereof, particularly on industrial upgrading, have not been taken into full 
consideration. For example, in the early 1980s, the National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB) pushed the tariff restructuring plan, but the MOF was 
unwilling to cooperate on the grounds of fiscal health (Muscat 1994: 198). A more recent 
example is the appeal from the Federation of Thai Industries in 2013, asking the BOT to 
help export sectors that had been hit hard by the unprecedentedly strong baht. 
Manufacturing production continued to contract in line with restrained consumption and 
exports. The proposals included slashing the policy rate, controlling capital inflows, and 
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switching from inflation targeting to exchange-rate targeting (Bangkok Post, April 27, 
2013).
8
 All were firmly opposed again without a thorough investigation into the limitations 
and opportunity costs of maintaining exceptionally low inflation and hard budget 
constraints (e.g. the adverse impacts on exports and economic growth, the impediment to 
industrial restructuring). 
Furthermore, even assuming away the limitations and opportunity costs of maintaining 
low inflation, this reform path has never come as a single piece, but offered within a more 
comprehensive package. With the unelected governments of Prem, Anand, and Surayud, 
fiscal tightening was pursued alongside pro-bureaucratic regulatory changes, delayed 
infrastructural upgrading, and considerable increases in military budgets. The resource 
misallocation and growth-impeding characters of this package deal should, at least, partly 
refute the bifurcated state claim as well as the political credibility lent to the 
macroeconomic agencies for Thailand’s past economic development. In contrast, with 
allegedly more corruption-prone and populist packages, it was the strong governments run 
by elected elites that oriented the country into bureaucratic and infrastructural reforms, with 
a more systemic industrial policymaking.  
Of course, this is not to say that the unelected administrations were economically 
worthless and elected politicians more worthwhile. Corruption and excessive expansionary 
programs led by elected politicians can do more harm than good, too. The point I am trying 
to make here is that the relative economic success of Thailand should not boil down largely 
to the “low inflation and hard budget constraints” factor. Industrial policies and ad hoc 
bureaucratic and infrastructural restructuring should be given greater weight, while the 
costs of a low-inflation regime demand careful scrutiny. Macroeconomy is a crucial part of 
sustaining growth. But if the ultimate goal is to maintain macroeconomic stability, there are 
a host of alternatives to inflation targeting (more on this below). 
                                                 
8
 The NESDB forecasted zero growth for Thai exports in the year 2013 (Bangkok Post, November 21, 2013). 
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3.2 Rethinking the Institutional Prerequisites of Industrial Policy 
With the rise of new institutional economics, the institutional prerequisites for industrial 
policymaking, rather than industrial policy itself, have become a matter for major concern. 
As Doner (2009: 56) states: “The question is not whether industrial policies…can promote 
growth, especially upgrading. They clearly can, but often do not…[A central point is]: more 
targeted policies require significant institutional strengths” (also in World Bank 1993). In 
the case of Thailand, inefficient bureaucracy and fragmented politics have been considered 
the two fundamental institutional deficiencies. Remedying these deficiencies is a sine qua 
non for effective industrial policymaking, the thinking goes. This part raises two neglected 
points in response to the overstatement of institutional prerequisites. 
Institutional deficiencies and human defiance 
To begin with, I argue that there are various political routes to overcoming institutional 
difficulties, even within one country. In the case of Thailand, the current success of 
petrochemicals and automobiles are mainly the result of industrial policy implemented in 
prior decades. For petrochemicals, the key political drive was the unelected elites, while in 
automobiles it was business associations and elected politicians. 
In petrochemicals, the dominance of royal-owned Siam Cement Group, founded by King 
Rama VI in 1913 and now 30% owned by the CPB, plays an important role, “in particular 
during periods of close collaboration between the prime minister and the royal family, as 
during the Prem period” (Lauridsen 2008: 605). Under political and bureaucratic 
fragmentation, CPB-owned companies can glue policy-makers together. Moreover, such 
fragmentation was not totally damaging. The third-party evaluation report of the ESDP by 
Shimomura (2000: 17) concludes that: “The military, the splinter parties, the technocrats, 
the conglomerates, the mass media and other groups continued to restrain each other in a 
unique web of checks and balances, and accordingly no single group was able to wield 
excessive power.” 
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With no royal influence, automobile associations lobbied for policy changes through 
elected politicians. For example, in 1983 then industry minister mooted the idea of a “Thai 
Vehicle” project aimed at increasing local contents to 100%. The project was welcomed by 
local part manufacturers, but faced strong resistance from carmakers and neoliberal 
technocrats. The “rough and tumble” of politics is not always bad, as the resulting 
compromise was the local production of diesel engines for one-ton pick-up trucks, two 
decades later the country’s most exported vehicles. On the whole, political fragmentation 
led to a consensual approach to policymaking in Thai automobiles, which “created stable 
expectations and confidence in the overall business environment” (International Trade 
Center 2010: 12). 
Capability vis-à-vis priority 
The confusion between priority and capability also deserves consideration. Often, 
institutional capability has already been there, waiting for the “right” priority to be 
identified. In a middle-income country like Thailand, bureaucratic capacity is typically 
underestimated in several ways. One example is the increase of tax collection by the 
Revenue Department in 2004 and 2010, which was the result not of institutional turnaround, 
but of buying new technology and changing priority.
9
 In 2004, despite the economic 
slowdown, the Revenue Department collected 23% more taxes than in the previous year, 
mainly because of the launch of the “e-Revenue” system and regulatory amendments to 
transfer pricing guidelines and swap payments. In 2010, a year of political turmoil, the 
Department brought another 320,000 people – who were supposed to have been counted in 
the first place – into the tax system and clamped down on tax evasion in certain sectors, 
                                                 
9
Tax revenue in Thailand is relatively low. In 2009 total tax revenues in Thailand accounted for 15.1% of 
GDP, compared to, say, 11.4% in Indonesia, 25.6% in South Korea, and 46.4% in Sweden (World Bank 
Data). In Thailand, the Revenue Department is responsible for collecting taxes regarding individual income, 
corporate income, value added, specific business, stamp duties, and petroleum income - all of which account 
for more than half of the country’s total tax revenues. 
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resulting in 11% higher tax collection (see Veerayooth 2012: 161-6).  
Another graphic example is the capacity for acquiring information for better 
policymaking. In Taiwan, during the catch-up period, the Ministry for Science and 
Technology spent time and budget monitoring the input–output matrix of electronics 
components, collecting daily information about what had been imported into Taiwan in the 
previous 24 hours and by whom. This information enabled industrial-policy officials to 
compare the quality and price of imports with the domestic products and to judge the 
performance of domestic producers in receipt of industrial-policy assistance (Wade 1993). 
Could Thai officials not effectively monitor and collect detailed information for national 
purpose? Indeed, the Thai counterparts could and did perform the task even more seriously, 
not in the area of industrial policy, but in lèse-majesté enforcement. From 2008 to 2010 the 
Ministry of Information and Communications Technology set up a pilot team to monitor 
and record all internet users in Thailand. They blocked at least 113,000 webpages on lèse-
majesté grounds. The minister declared that his “highest priority is the protection of the 
monarchy” (The Economist, July 5, 2009). That said, the capacity of Thai bureaucracy to 
monitor and process the information is high – it is just employed for a purpose other than 
economic development. If only industrial policymaking (as well as other thorny issues, say, 
illegal activities and tax evasion) were taken as seriously as a national problem as lèse-
majesté by policy-makers, Thailand’s economic development would have gone further 
without the need to improve bureaucratic capability. 
In summary, since North (1990: 3) defined institutions as “the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction”, most of the institutionalist literature has been 
directed toward the study of institutions as constraints. Accordingly, together with the rise 
of new institutionalism is the overestimation of institutional factors as the explanatory 
primacy for political–economic phenomena and the underestimation of the role of human 
agency (see theoretical discussion in Veerayooth 2012). There is plenty of room for agents 
to make deliberate choices, although the range of choices that agents make is limited by the 
31 
 
ideas they hold and the structures they live in. Deliberate political actions have played a key 
role in overcoming deficient institutions throughout catching-up histories (see examples 
from Korea in Chang 1994). Moreover, the relationship between political fragmentation 
and effective policymaking is not a linear one, as multi-party governments can provide a set 
of credible constraints on policy disruption and therefore bolster confidence among private 
actors (see Nooruddin 2011). Greater attention should be paid to “exceptional” cases that 
cannot be explained by structurally determined conditions. In addition, changes in formal 
institutions, such as constitutions in Thailand, can improve capability for policy 
formulation and implementation. 
3.3 Escaping from the Middle-income Trap 
The findings and perspectives discussed thus far have led us to two critical suggestions as 
to how Thailand can move from middle- to high-income status. First and foremost, given 
that manufacturing competitiveness and export composition of high local value-added are 
the key attributes of successful catching up (see Veerayooth and Patarapong 2013; Felipe et 
al. 2012), Thailand needs to tip the macroeconomic–industrial balance in favor of the latter.  
On the one hand, macroeconomic stabilization is a necessity. However, apart from a 
problematic inflation-targeting regime, there are various options that can provide the 
overarching theme of maintaining macroeconomic stability. For example, maintenance of a 
competitive real exchange rate; implementation of capital management techniques; an 
explicit statement of output and employment goals; and incomes and anti-monopoly 
policies to limit inflation to moderate levels. To the extent possible, economic policy 
should focus on the variables of ultimate concern, such as efficiency, growth, and equity, 
rather than an intermediate variable like inflation (see Epstein and Yeldan 2009; Stiglitz et 
al. 2006). On the other hand, industrial policymaking should be posited on the same level 
as other types of policymaking, be it education, health, or social policies, in the sense that it 
will certainly be confronted by problems and difficulties in terms of implementation, 
needless to say wasteful outcomes. But the tasks of policymakers and academics are to 
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minimize such problems and to maximize the benefits. Moreover, almost all policies in 
reality inevitably favor certain sectors and actors over others, and therefore have 
discriminatory effects that amount to targeting (Rodrik 2008). In Thailand strong 
governments of both unelected and elected elites had implemented industrial policies, 
mostly in an unsystematic manner. Therefore, designing it in a methodical way, with an 
explicit yardstick and exit strategy, should be a more productive and accountable enterprise 
than deploying it with blind prejudice.  
Last but not least, effective economic reform demands constitutional change to support 
strong administration. Short-lived, multi-party governments in the post-1980 period have 
been a product of constitutional design, rather than a result of social norms or a lack of 
threats. The 2007 Constitution has been designed to turn the country back to a 
“bureaucratic polity” amid the rise of electoral democracy, by undermining the power of 
the executive branch and strengthening that of the traditional elites. Appointing and 
reshuffling civil and military officials by the cabinet has been made stiffer. In post-1980 
history, this sort of regulation has formally impeded the capacities and incentives of 
political leaders for reform, and informally forced the compromise between the two elites. 
As seen in the Yingluck government (2011-14), forced compromise discounted the 
possibility of bureaucratic reform, industrial upgrading, tax reforms, and military budget 
cuts. To please its constituencies without alienating its constitutionally empowered enemies, 
the Yingluck government, albeit with a landslide election victory, moved toward more 
populist policy packages, including the rice-pledging scheme, farm debt moratorium, 
rebates and tax cuts.
10
 If institutions are seen – as most institutionalists believe – as being 
temporally prior to individuals, the current constitution is functioning as a reform 
obstruction.  
                                                 
10
 However, the Yingluck government also endorsed the 300-baht minimum wage (40% increase), the second 
phase of Eco-Car project, and investment plans for high-speed railway and infrastructural megaprojects. 
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IV. Conclusion: Within-country Growth Dynamics 
Since the 1980s Thailand has undergone political–economic dynamics beyond the single-
dimensional concept like a “bureaucratic policy” can capture. This article provides an 
institutionalist explanation for reform politics and economic consequences between 1980 
and 2011. My explanation rests on the institutional interplay of coalition struggle and 
constitutional design. Conditioned by ruling-coalition type and government type, the 
reform has alternated across four paths in the past three decades: (a) fiscal tightening and 
exclusive industrial policy; (b) an expansionary budget and inclusive industrial policy; (c) 
international conformism; and (d) provincial, pork-barrel projects. As a consequence, the 
country’s relative economic achievement should be attributed to the combination of 
macroeconomic stability, certain industrial policies, and ad hoc bureaucratic and 
infrastructural restructuring. The appraisal of reform outcomes, as well as political 
credibility to be lent, should be made in a more balanced manner between the unelected and 
elected elites. The bifurcated state concept, the relationship between inflation and growth, 
and issues regarding industrial policy and institutions, all require a rethink.   
In more general terms, this article carries implications for the recent debate over within-
country growth dynamics. The existing literature on the politics of growth usually 
compares countries based on their average growth of per capita income, thereby 
overlooking the fact that most countries undergo dramatic fluctuations in growth. As 
pointed out by Sen (2013), there is a need to shift from the determinants of long-run 
average economic growth to an understanding of the determinants of within-country growth 
patterns. Two dominant theories representing this analytical shift are those of Khan, and of 
Acemoglu and Robinson. Focusing on the distribution of power and informal institutions of 
patron–client networks, Khan (2010) characterizes Thailand between 1970 and 2001 as 
“competitive clientelism”, with 2001-08 being the “unproductive dominant party” period. 
This article hopes to offer a more subtle reform variation than characterized by Khan, and 
sheds more light on the constructive role of a formal institution like constitutions in shaping 
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reform capability. In line with Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), my explanation for 
differing reform paths is based on the interaction between de jure (constitutional design) 
and de facto (coalition politics) institutions. However, this article contends that growth-
enhancing behaviors can take place despite – and sometimes because of – deficient 
institutions. Moreover, regarding underlying economic theory for interpreting growth 
outcomes, I find the dichotomy of “inclusive” and “extractive” institutions too simplistic, to 
the neglect of state intervention and industrial policies observed widely in East and 
Southeast Asia. In a nutshell, the Thai case studied here is supportive of the emerging 
research agenda on within-country growth patterns, but provides an alternative approach to 
analyzing the politics and economics of policy reform in developing countries. 
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